Papers › Text-to-Image Diffusion Models can be Easily Backdoored through Multimodal Data Poisoning

Text-to-Image Diffusion Models can be Easily Backdoored through Multimodal Data Poisoning

7 May 2023arXiv:2305.04175archive 2025-07-28

Shengfang Zhai, Yinpeng Dong, Qingni Shen, Shi Pu, Yuejian Fang, Hang Su

With the help of conditioning mechanisms, the state-of-the-art diffusion models have achieved tremendous success in guided image generation, particularly in text-to-image synthesis. To gain a better understanding of the training process and potential risks of text-to-image synthesis, we perform a systematic investigation of backdoor attack on text-to-image diffusion models and propose BadT2I, a general multimodal backdoor attack framework that tampers with image synthesis in diverse semantic levels. Specifically, we perform backdoor attacks on three levels of the vision semantics: Pixel-Backdoor, Object-Backdoor and Style-Backdoor. By utilizing a regularization loss, our methods efficiently inject backdoors into a large-scale text-to-image diffusion model while preserving its utility with benign inputs. We conduct empirical experiments on Stable Diffusion, the widely-used text-to-image diffusion model, demonstrating that the large-scale diffusion model can be easily backdoored within a few fine-tuning steps. We conduct additional experiments to explore the impact of different types of textual triggers, as well as the backdoor persistence during further training, providing insights for the development of backdoor defense methods. Besides, our investigation may contribute to the copyright protection of text-to-image models in the future.

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Tasks

Backdoor AttackData PoisoningImage Generationbackdoor defense

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Diffusion

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