Papers › Snooping Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning
Snooping Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning
Matthew Inkawhich, Yiran Chen, Hai Li
Adversarial attacks have exposed a significant security vulnerability in state-of-the-art machine learning models. Among these models include deep reinforcement learning agents. The existing methods for attacking reinforcement learning agents assume the adversary either has access to the target agent's learned parameters or the environment that the agent interacts with. In this work, we propose a new class of threat models, called snooping threat models, that are unique to reinforcement learning. In these snooping threat models, the adversary does not have the ability to interact with the target agent's environment, and can only eavesdrop on the action and reward signals being exchanged between agent and environment. We show that adversaries operating in these highly constrained threat models can still launch devastating attacks against the target agent by training proxy models on related tasks and leveraging the transferability of adversarial examples.
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