Papers › Revisiting the Robustness of Watermarking to Paraphrasing Attacks
Revisiting the Robustness of Watermarking to Paraphrasing Attacks
Saksham Rastogi, Danish Pruthi
Amidst rising concerns about the internet being proliferated with content generated from language models (LMs), watermarking is seen as a principled way to certify whether text was generated from a model. Many recent watermarking techniques slightly modify the output probabilities of LMs to embed a signal in the generated output that can later be detected. Since early proposals for text watermarking, questions about their robustness to paraphrasing have been prominently discussed. Lately, some techniques are deliberately designed and claimed to be robust to paraphrasing. However, such watermarking schemes do not adequately account for the ease with which they can be reverse-engineered. We show that with access to only a limited number of generations from a black-box watermarked model, we can drastically increase the effectiveness of paraphrasing attacks to evade watermark detection, thereby rendering the watermark ineffective.
In Syntology Open this paper in Syntology's Atlas, the map of the papers in Syntology's graph and their citations.
Code
Repository list and official/mentioned flags are the archive's, frozen 2025-07-28. Reachability, where shown, is from one Syntology probe window (2026-09-16 to 2026-09-18); repositories not probed show nothing. GitHub stars are not tracked.
Code Syntology ran Syntology
Not run by Syntology. Nothing on this page verifies that the listed code works.
Results from the paper archive 2025-07-28
No leaderboard rows for this paper in the archive.
Report a problem or propose a change · a person checks every report against the paper or source before anything changes; decisions are listed on /corrections