Papers › Rethinking the Backdoor Attacks' Triggers: A Frequency Perspective

Rethinking the Backdoor Attacks' Triggers: A Frequency Perspective

7 Apr 2021ICCV 2021 10arXiv:2104.03413archive 2025-07-28

Yi Zeng, Won Park, Z. Morley Mao, Ruoxi Jia

Backdoor attacks have been considered a severe security threat to deep learning. Such attacks can make models perform abnormally on inputs with predefined triggers and still retain state-of-the-art performance on clean data. While backdoor attacks have been thoroughly investigated in the image domain from both attackers' and defenders' sides, an analysis in the frequency domain has been missing thus far. This paper first revisits existing backdoor triggers from a frequency perspective and performs a comprehensive analysis. Our results show that many current backdoor attacks exhibit severe high-frequency artifacts, which persist across different datasets and resolutions. We further demonstrate these high-frequency artifacts enable a simple way to detect existing backdoor triggers at a detection rate of 98.50% without prior knowledge of the attack details and the target model. Acknowledging previous attacks' weaknesses, we propose a practical way to create smooth backdoor triggers without high-frequency artifacts and study their detectability. We show that existing defense works can benefit by incorporating these smooth triggers into their design consideration. Moreover, we show that the detector tuned over stronger smooth triggers can generalize well to unseen weak smooth triggers. In short, our work emphasizes the importance of considering frequency analysis when designing both backdoor attacks and defenses in deep learning.

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gauss_smooth YiZeng623/frequency-backdoor/Sec5_Smooth_Trigger/gauss_smooth.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · d4e7f2f02076d61c · report
jacobian YiZeng623/frequency-backdoor/Sec5_Smooth_Trigger/target_universal.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · dfb6883fc6ed9988 · report
normalization YiZeng623/frequency-backdoor/Sec5_Smooth_Trigger/gauss_smooth.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · df113a59813760b1 · report
tar_deepfool YiZeng623/frequency-backdoor/Sec5_Smooth_Trigger/deepfool.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · 82da29c6298f012a · report
tensor2img YiZeng623/frequency-backdoor/Sec5_Smooth_Trigger/gauss_smooth.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · 632b7b52eee34480 · report

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