Papers › Protecting Vehicle Location Privacy with Contextually-Driven Synthetic Location Generation
Protecting Vehicle Location Privacy with Contextually-Driven Synthetic Location Generation
Sourabh Yadav, Chenyang Yu, Xinpeng Xie, Yan Huang, Chenxi Qiu
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Geo-obfuscation is a Location Privacy Protection Mechanism used in location-based services that allows users to report obfuscated locations instead of exact ones. A formal privacy criterion, geoindistinguishability (Geo-Ind), requires real locations to be hard to distinguish from nearby locations (by attackers) based on their obfuscated representations. However, Geo-Ind often fails to consider context, such as road networks and vehicle traffic conditions, making it less effective in protecting the location privacy of vehicles, of which the mobility are heavily influenced by these factors. In this paper, we introduce VehiTrack, a new threat model to demonstrate the vulnerability of Geo-Ind in protecting vehicle location privacy from context-aware inference attacks. Our experiments demonstrate that VehiTrack can accurately determine exact vehicle locations from obfuscated data, reducing average inference errors by 61.20% with Laplacian noise and 47.35% with linear programming (LP) compared to traditional Bayesian attacks. By using contextual data like road networks and traffic flow, VehiTrack effectively eliminates a significant number of seemingly "impossible" locations during its search for the actual location of the vehicles. Based on these insights, we propose TransProtect, a new geo-obfuscation approach that limits obfuscation to realistic vehicle movement patterns, complicating attackers' ability to differentiate obfuscated from actual locations. Our results show that TransProtect increases VehiTrack's inference error by 57.75% with Laplacian noise and 27.21% with LP, significantly enhancing protection against these attacks.
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