Papers › Policy Design for Two-sided Platforms with Participation Dynamics
Policy Design for Two-sided Platforms with Participation Dynamics
Haruka Kiyohara, Fan Yao, Sarah Dean
In two-sided platforms (e.g., video streaming or e-commerce), viewers and providers engage in interactive dynamics: viewers benefit from increases in provider populations, while providers benefit from increases in viewer population. Despite the importance of such "population effects" on long-term platform health, recommendation policies do not generally take the participation dynamics into account. This paper thus studies the dynamics and recommender policy design on two-sided platforms under the population effects for the first time. Our control- and game-theoretic findings warn against the use of the standard "myopic-greedy" policy and shed light on the importance of provider-side considerations (i.e., effectively distributing exposure among provider groups) to improve social welfare via population growth. We also present a simple algorithm to optimize long-term social welfare by taking the population effects into account, and demonstrate its effectiveness in synthetic and real-data experiments. Our experiment code is available at https://github.com/sdean-group/dynamics-two-sided-market.
In Syntology Open this paper in Syntology's Atlas, the map of the papers in Syntology's graph and their citations.
Code
Repository list and official/mentioned flags are the archive's, frozen 2025-07-28. Reachability, where shown, is from one Syntology probe window (2026-09-16 to 2026-09-18); repositories not probed show nothing. GitHub stars are not tracked.
Code Syntology ran Syntology
Not run by Syntology. Nothing on this page verifies that the listed code works.
Results from the paper archive 2025-07-28
No leaderboard rows for this paper in the archive.
Report a problem or propose a change · a person checks every report against the paper or source before anything changes; decisions are listed on /corrections