Papers › Optimal Defenses Against Gradient Reconstruction Attacks
Optimal Defenses Against Gradient Reconstruction Attacks
Yuxiao Chen, Gamze Gürsoy, Qi Lei
Federated Learning (FL) is designed to prevent data leakage through collaborative model training without centralized data storage. However, it remains vulnerable to gradient reconstruction attacks that recover original training data from shared gradients. To optimize the trade-off between data leakage and utility loss, we first derive a theoretical lower bound of reconstruction error (among all attackers) for the two standard methods: adding noise, and gradient pruning. We then customize these two defenses to be parameter- and model-specific and achieve the optimal trade-off between our obtained reconstruction lower bound and model utility. Experimental results validate that our methods outperform Gradient Noise and Gradient Pruning by protecting the training data better while also achieving better utility.
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