Papers › Opinion evolution in closed community

Opinion evolution in closed community

10 Jan 2001arXiv:cond-mat/0101130links table onlyarchive 2025-07-28

Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron, Jozef Sznajd

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A simple Ising spin model which can describe a mechanism of making a decision in a closed community is proposed. It is shown via standard Monte Carlo simulations that very simple rules lead to rather complicated dynamics and to a power law in the decision time distribution. It is found that a closed community has to evolve either to a dictatorship or a stalemate state (inability to take any common decision). A common decision can be taken in a "democratic way" only by an open community.

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