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On How Kelsenian Jurisprudence and Intuitionistic Logic help to avoid Contrary-to-Duty paradoxes in Legal Ontologies

20 Mar 2018arXiv:1803.07543links table onlyarchive 2025-07-28

Edward Hermann Haeusler, Alexandre Rademaker

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In this article we show how Hans Kelsen jurisprudence and Intuitionistic logic are used to avoid the well-known contrary-to-duty (CTD) paradoxes, such as Chisholm paradoxes and its variants. This article uses an intuitionistic version of the ALC description logic, named iALC, to show how an ontology based on individually valid legal statements is able to avoid CTDs by providing models to them.

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