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ODEs and Mandatory Voting
Christoph Börgers, Natasa Dragovic, Anna Haensch, Arkadz Kirshtein, Lilla Orr
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This paper presents mathematics relevant to the question whether voting should be mandatory. Assuming a static distribution of voters' political beliefs, we model how politicians might adjust their positions to raise their share of the vote. Various scenarios can be explored using our web-based app (see text for the link). Abstentions are found to have great impact on the dynamics of candidates, and in particular to introduce the possibility of discontinuous jumps in optimal candidate positions. This is a paper intended for undergraduate students. It is an unusual application of ODEs. We hope that it might help engage some students who may find it harder to connect with the more customary applications from the natural sciences.
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