Papers › Most Websites Don't Need to Vibrate: A Cost-Benefit Approach to Improving Browser Security
Most Websites Don't Need to Vibrate: A Cost-Benefit Approach to Improving Browser Security
Peter Snyder, Cynthia Taylor, Chris Kanich
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Modern web browsers have accrued an incredibly broad set of features since being invented for hypermedia dissemination in 1990. Many of these features benefit users by enabling new types of web applications. However, some features also bring risk to users' privacy and security, whether through implementation error, unexpected composition, or unintended use. Currently there is no general methodology for weighing these costs and benefits. Restricting access to only the features which are necessary for delivering desired functionality on a given website would allow users to enforce the principle of lease privilege on use of the myriad APIs present in the modern web browser. However, security benefits gained by increasing restrictions must be balanced against the risk of breaking existing websites. This work addresses this problem with a methodology for weighing the costs and benefits of giving websites default access to each browser feature. We model the benefit as the number of websites that require the feature for some user-visible benefit, and the cost as the number of CVEs, lines of code, and academic attacks related to the functionality. We then apply this methodology to 74 Web API standards implemented in modern browsers. We find that allowing websites default access to large parts of the Web API poses significant security and privacy risks, with little corresponding benefit. We also introduce a configurable browser extension that allows users to selectively restrict access to low-benefit, high-risk features on a per site basis. We evaluated our extension with two hardened browser configurations, and found that blocking 15 of the 74 standards avoids 52.0% of code paths related to previous CVEs, and 50.0% of implementation code identified by our metric, without affecting the functionality of 94.7% of measured websites.
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