Papers › Mechanized Noninterference for Gradual Security
Mechanized Noninterference for Gradual Security
Tianyu Chen, Jeremy G. Siek
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This paper presents the first machine-checked proof of noninterference for a language with gradual information-flow control, thereby establishing a rock solid foundation for secure programming languages that give programmers the choice between runtime versus compile-time enforcement. Along the way we uncovered a flaw in one of the noninterference proofs in the literature, and give a counterexample for one of the main lemmas. The particular language studied in this paper, λ_(SEC)^⋆, is based on the GLIO language of Azevedo de Amorim et al. [2020]. To make the design more accessible to other researchers, this paper contributes the first traditional semantics for the language, that is, we define compilation from λ_(SEC)^⋆ to a cast calculus and design a reduction semantics for the latter that includes blame tracking. In addition to the proof of noninterference, we also mechanize proofs of type safety, determinism, and that compilation preserves types.
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