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Large Language Models Are Involuntary Truth-Tellers: Exploiting Fallacy Failure for Jailbreak Attacks

1 Jul 2024arXiv:2407.00869archive 2025-07-28

Yue Zhou, Henry Peng Zou, Barbara Di Eugenio, Yang Zhang

We find that language models have difficulties generating fallacious and deceptive reasoning. When asked to generate deceptive outputs, language models tend to leak honest counterparts but believe them to be false. Exploiting this deficiency, we propose a jailbreak attack method that elicits an aligned language model for malicious output. Specifically, we query the model to generate a fallacious yet deceptively real procedure for the harmful behavior. Since a fallacious procedure is generally considered fake and thus harmless by LLMs, it helps bypass the safeguard mechanism. Yet the output is factually harmful since the LLM cannot fabricate fallacious solutions but proposes truthful ones. We evaluate our approach over five safety-aligned large language models, comparing four previous jailbreak methods, and show that our approach achieves competitive performance with more harmful outputs. We believe the findings could be extended beyond model safety, such as self-verification and hallucination.

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Code

Syntology 2 code samples harvested from 1 repository linked to this paper: 1 ran (of which 1 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 0 violated, 1 with no contract checked; 0 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 1 unverified; the one sample that ran constructed an object rather than computing a result. “Where Syntology's instrument failed” counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code; here there are none.

By repository: official repository: 2 samples from 1 repository, 1 ran (1 with no instrument failure; 0 where Syntology's instrument failed). The run record, sample by sample. “Ran” means executed on a synthesized input, not that the code is correct or reproduces the paper.

Levels written on 2026-09-22 (UTC): the dates Syntology's graph wrote each sample's verification level, not when the code executed.

Yue-LLM-Pit/FFA officialSyntology: 2 samples, 1 ran (0 instrument-failed) · 1 unverified report

Repository list and official/mentioned flags are the archive's, frozen 2025-07-28. Reachability, where shown, is from one Syntology probe window (2026-09-16 to 2026-09-18); repositories not probed show nothing. GitHub stars are not tracked.

Code Syntology ran Syntology

2 samples harvested: 1 ran (of which 1 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 0 violated, 1 with no contract checked; 0 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 1 unverified; the one sample that ran constructed an object rather than computing a result. “Where Syntology's instrument failed” counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code. Syntology's record for this page has not changed since , the first build that kept a record date for it; when this build read Syntology's graph is in the build record. That date is not when the samples ran.

1ran
1unverified

Licence: 0 of the 2 samples are pointer only, meaning Syntology does not serve that copy's text. This page shows no code text for any sample; each one links to its file in the repository.

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Yue-LLM-Pit/FFA official repository 2 samples, 1 ran (0 instrument-failed) · 1 unverified
FFA jailbreak.py ran MIT (permissive) · e3cd114d05c0a47c · report fixture: returned FFA · level recorded 2026-09-22
openai_chat_fast_gen jailbreak.py unverified MIT (permissive) · 5885c5210fcad322 · report

Method as code Syntology

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1 assembly on this paper: 1 harvested, 0 generated.

harvested Assembly for jailbreak attack method (graph method: jailbreak attack method). 2 bricks; individually on a fixture: 1 ran (of which 1 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 0 violated, 1 with no contract checked; 0 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 1 unverified; the one sample that ran constructed an object rather than computing a result. The assembly has not been run end-to-end.

  1. FFA entry · level 1 · ran · e3cd114d05c0a47c
  2. openai_chat_fast_gen model · level 0 · unverified · 5885c5210fcad322

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HallucinationLanguage ModelingLanguage Modelling

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