Papers › Instantaneous and limiting behavior of an n-node blockchain under cyber attacks from a...
Instantaneous and limiting behavior of an n-node blockchain under cyber attacks from a single hacker
Xiufeng Xu, Liang Hong
The archive published only this paper's code-link row. Authors, date and abstract are from arXiv's metadata (CC0), read from the Kaggle arXiv metadata snapshot of 2026-09-12 where its title matched the archive's; the title is the archive's.
We investigate the instantaneous and limiting behavior of an n-node blockchain which is under continuous monitoring of the IT department of a company but faces non-stop cyber attacks from a single hacker. The blockchain is functional as far as no data stored on it has been changed, deleted, or locked. Once the IT department detects the attack from the hacker, it will immediately re-set the blockchain, rendering all previous efforts of the hacker in vain. The hacker will not stop until the blockchain is dysfunctional. For arbitrary distributions of the hacking times and detecting times, we derive the limiting functional probability, instantaneous functional probability, and mean functional time of the blockchain. We also show that all these quantities are increasing functions of the number of nodes, substantiating the intuition that the more nodes a blockchain has, the harder it is for a hacker to succeed in a cyber attack.
Code
Repository list and official/mentioned flags are the archive's, frozen 2025-07-28. Reachability, where shown, is from one Syntology probe window (2026-09-16 to 2026-09-18); repositories not probed show nothing. GitHub stars are not tracked.
Code Syntology ran Syntology
Not run by Syntology. Nothing on this page verifies that the listed code works.
Results from the paper archive 2025-07-28
No leaderboard rows for this paper in the archive.
Report a problem or propose a change · a person checks every report against the paper or source before anything changes; decisions are listed on /corrections