Papers › How Social Network Structure Impacts the Ability of Zealots to Promote Weak Opinions
How Social Network Structure Impacts the Ability of Zealots to Promote Weak Opinions
Thomas Tunstall
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Social networks are often permeated by agents who promote their opinions without allowing for their own mind to be changed: Understanding how these so-called `zealots' act to increase the prevalence of their promoted opinion over the network is important for understanding opinion dynamics. In this work, we consider these promoted opinions to be `weak' and therefore less likely to be accepted relative to the default opinion in the network. We show how the proportion of zealots in the network, the relative strength of the weak opinion, and the structure of the network impact the long-term proportion of the those in the network who subscribe to the weak opinion.
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