Papers › Got Root? A Linux Priv-Esc Benchmark
Got Root? A Linux Priv-Esc Benchmark
Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito
The archive published only this paper's code-link row. Authors, date and abstract are from arXiv's metadata (CC0), read from the Kaggle arXiv metadata snapshot of 2026-09-12 where its title matched the archive's; the title is the archive's.
Linux systems are integral to the infrastructure of modern computing environments, necessitating robust security measures to prevent unauthorized access. Privilege escalation attacks represent a significant threat, typically allowing attackers to elevate their privileges from an initial low-privilege account to the all-powerful root account. A benchmark set of vulnerable systems is of high importance to evaluate the effectiveness of privilege-escalation techniques performed by both humans and automated tooling. Analyzing their behavior allows defenders to better fortify their entrusted Linux systems and thus protect their infrastructure from potentially devastating attacks. To address this gap, we developed a comprehensive benchmark for Linux privilege escalation. It provides a standardized platform to evaluate and compare the performance of human and synthetic actors, e.g., hacking scripts or automated tooling.
In Syntology Open this paper in Syntology's Atlas, the map of the papers in Syntology's graph and their citations.
Code
Repository list and official/mentioned flags are the archive's, frozen 2025-07-28. Reachability, where shown, is from one Syntology probe window (2026-09-16 to 2026-09-18); repositories not probed show nothing. GitHub stars are not tracked.
Code Syntology ran Syntology
Not run by Syntology. Nothing on this page verifies that the listed code works.
Results from the paper archive 2025-07-28
No leaderboard rows for this paper in the archive.
Report a problem or propose a change · a person checks every report against the paper or source before anything changes; decisions are listed on /corrections