Papers › Games Without Frontiers: Investigating Video Games as a Covert Channel

Games Without Frontiers: Investigating Video Games as a Covert Channel

19 Mar 2015arXiv:1503.05904links table onlyarchive 2025-07-28

Bridger Hahn, Rishab Nithyanand, Phillipa Gill, Rob Johnson

The archive published only this paper's code-link row. Authors, date and abstract are from arXiv's metadata (CC0), read from the Kaggle arXiv metadata snapshot of 2026-09-12 where its title matched the archive's; the title is the archive's.

The Internet has become a critical communication infrastructure for citizens to organize protests and express dissatisfaction with their governments. This fact has not gone unnoticed, with governments clamping down on this medium via censorship, and circumvention researchers working to stay one step ahead. In this paper, we explore a promising new avenue for covert channels: real-time strategy-video games. Video games have two key features that make them attractive cover protocols for censorship circumvention. First, due to the popularity of gaming platforms such as Steam, there are a lot of different video games, each with their own protocols and server infrastructure. Users of video-game-based censorship-circumvention tools can therefore diversify across many games, making it difficult for the censor to respond by simply blocking a single cover protocol. Second, games in the same genre have many common features and concepts. As a result, the same covert channel framework can be easily adapted to work with many different games. This means that circumvention tool developers can stay ahead of the censor by creating a diverse set of tools and by quickly adapting to blockades created by the censor. We demonstrate the feasibility of this approach by implementing our coding scheme over two real-time strategy-games (including a very popular closed-source game). We evaluate the security of our system prototype -- Castle -- by quantifying its resilience to a censor-adversary, its similarity to real game traffic, and its ability to avoid common pitfalls in covert channel design. We use our prototype to demonstrate that our approach can provide throughput which is amenable to transfer of textual data, such at e-mail, SMS messages, and tweets, which are commonly used to organize political actions.

PaperPDFCode

Code

bridgar/Castle-Covert-Channel officialmentioned in papermentioned on GitHub report

Repository list and official/mentioned flags are the archive's, frozen 2025-07-28. Reachability, where shown, is from one Syntology probe window (2026-09-16 to 2026-09-18); repositories not probed show nothing. GitHub stars are not tracked.

Code Syntology ran Syntology

Not run by Syntology. Nothing on this page verifies that the listed code works.

Results from the paper archive 2025-07-28

No leaderboard rows for this paper in the archive.

Report a problem or propose a change · a person checks every report against the paper or source before anything changes; decisions are listed on /corrections