Papers › Formal Security Analysis of the AMD SEV-SNP Software Interface
Formal Security Analysis of the AMD SEV-SNP Software Interface
Petar Paradžik, Ante Derek, Marko Horvat
The archive published only this paper's code-link row. Authors, date and abstract are from arXiv's metadata (CC0), read from the Kaggle arXiv metadata snapshot of 2026-09-12 where its title matched the archive's; the title is the archive's.
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization technologies enable confidential computing by protecting virtual machines from highly privileged software such as hypervisors. In this work, we develop the first, comprehensive symbolic model of the software interface of the latest SEV iteration called SEV Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP). Our model covers remote attestation, key derivation, page swap and live migration. We analyze the security of the software interface of SEV-SNP and formally prove that most critical secrecy, authentication, attestation and freshness properties do indeed hold in the model. Furthermore, we find that the platform-agnostic nature of messages exchanged between SNP guests and the AMD Secure Processor firmware presents a potential weakness in the design. We show how this weakness leads to formal attacks on multiple security properties, including the partial compromise of attestation report integrity, and discuss possible impacts and mitigations.
Code
Repository list and official/mentioned flags are the archive's, frozen 2025-07-28. Reachability, where shown, is from one Syntology probe window (2026-09-16 to 2026-09-18); repositories not probed show nothing. GitHub stars are not tracked.
Code Syntology ran Syntology
Not run by Syntology. Nothing on this page verifies that the listed code works.
Results from the paper archive 2025-07-28
No leaderboard rows for this paper in the archive.
Report a problem or propose a change · a person checks every report against the paper or source before anything changes; decisions are listed on /corrections