Papers › Exploring eFPGA-based Redaction for IP Protection
Exploring eFPGA-based Redaction for IP Protection
Jitendra Bhandari, Abdul Khader Thalakkattu Moosa, Benjamin Tan, Christian Pilato, Ganesh Gore, Xifan Tang, Scott Temple, Pierre-Emmanuel Gaillardon, Ramesh Karri
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Recently, eFPGA-based redaction has been proposed as a promising solution for hiding parts of a digital design from untrusted entities, where legitimate end-users can restore functionality by loading the withheld bitstream after fabrication. However, when deciding which parts of a design to redact, there are a number of practical issues that designers need to consider, including area and timing overheads, as well as security factors. Adapting an open-source FPGA fabric generation flow, we perform a case study to explore the trade-offs when redacting different modules of open-source intellectual property blocks (IPs) and explore how different parts of an eFPGA contribute to the security. We provide new insights into the feasibility and challenges of using eFPGA-based redaction as a security solution.
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