Papers › Evaluating the Instruction-Following Robustness of Large Language Models to Prompt Injection

Evaluating the Instruction-Following Robustness of Large Language Models to Prompt Injection

17 Aug 2023arXiv:2308.10819archive 2025-07-28

Zekun Li, Baolin Peng, Pengcheng He, Xifeng Yan

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

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Code

Syntology 5 code samples harvested from 2 repositories linked to this paper: 4 ran (of which 0 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 3 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 3 violated, 0 with no contract checked; 1 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 1 unverified. Where Syntology's instrument failed: 1 where our contract draft was wrong; failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code.

By repository: official repository: 5 samples from 2 repositories, 4 ran (3 with no instrument failure; 1 where Syntology's instrument failed). The run record, sample by sample. “Ran” means executed on a synthesized input, not that the code is correct or reproduces the paper.

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leezekun/adv-instruct-eval officialmentioned in paperSyntology: 1 sample, 1 ran (0 instrument-failed) · 0 unverified report
leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval officialmentioned in paperSyntology: 4 samples, 3 ran (1 instrument-failed) · 1 unverified report

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5 samples harvested: 4 ran (of which 0 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 3 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 3 violated, 0 with no contract checked; 1 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 1 unverified. “Where Syntology's instrument failed” counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code. Syntology's record for this page has not changed since , the first build that kept a record date for it; when this build read Syntology's graph is in the build record. That date is not when the samples ran.

3ran · violated contract
1ran · our draft was wrong
1unverified

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leezekun/adv-instruct-eval official repository 1 sample, 1 ran (0 instrument-failed) · 0 unverified
recall_score llm_utils.py ran · violated contract fingerprinted no licence file found · pointer only · 7d7caebd5329a4fc · report fixture: signature prediction:str/0/str, ground_truth:str/0/str · returned bool · level recorded 2026-09-22
leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval official repository 4 samples, 3 ran (1 instrument-failed) · 1 unverified
exact_match_score in 82 papers qa_utils.py ran · violated contract fingerprinted no licence file found · pointer only · bf75673211903e14 · report fixture: signature prediction:str/0/str, ground_truth:str/0/str · returned bool · level recorded 2026-09-22
normalize_answer in 304 papers qa_utils.py ran · our draft was wrong fingerprinted no licence file found · pointer only · e7e75981cb464788 · report fixture: signature s:str/0/str · returned str · level recorded, date not recorded
str2bool in 533 papers qa_utils.py ran · violated contract no licence file found · pointer only · 7c508037b40522af · report fixture: signature v:str/0/str · returned bool · level recorded, date not recorded
load_hf_model llm_utils.py unverified no licence file found · pointer only · 3d1f5cfe9ea15031 · report

Tasks

Instruction Following

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Methods

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