Papers › Discovering Strategic Behaviors for Collaborative Content-Production in Social Networks
Discovering Strategic Behaviors for Collaborative Content-Production in Social Networks
Yuxin Xiao, Adit Krishnan, Hari Sundaram
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Some social networks provide explicit mechanisms to allocate social rewards such as reputation based on user activity, while the mechanism is more opaque in other networks. Nonetheless, there are always individuals who obtain greater rewards and reputation than their peers. An intuitive yet important question to ask is whether these successful users employ strategic behaviors to become influential. It might appear that the influencers have gamed the system. However, it remains difficult to conclude the rationality of their actions due to factors like the combinatorial strategy space, inability to determine payoffs, and resource limitations faced by individuals. The challenging nature of this question has drawn attention from both the theory and data mining communities. Therefore, in this paper, we are motivated to investigate if resource-limited individuals discover strategic behaviors associated with high payoffs when producing collaborative or interactive content in social networks. We propose a novel framework of Dynamic Dual Attention Networks or DDAN which models content production strategies of users through a generative process, under the influence of social interactions involved in the process. Extensive experimental results illustrate the effectiveness of our model in modeling user behavior. We make three strong empirical findings. Different strategies give rise to different social payoffs, the best performing individuals exhibit stability in their preference over the discovered strategies, which indicates the emergence of strategic behavior, and the stability of strategy preference is correlated with high payoffs.
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