Papers › Coconut E-Petition Implementation
Coconut E-Petition Implementation
Jad Wahab
The archive published only this paper's code-link row. Authors, date and abstract are from arXiv's metadata (CC0), read from the Kaggle arXiv metadata snapshot of 2026-09-12 where its title matched the archive's; the title is the archive's.
In this dissertation project, we describe and implement a practical system application based on a selective disclosure credential scheme, namely the Coconut credential scheme\cite{sonnino_coconut:_2018}. The specific application here is an electronic petition system with the distinctive added feature of unlinkability as well as anonymity: such that no information about the anonymous petition voter is linkable back to the individual. In other words, there is no data leaked about who voted in the petition, just that the users who did, were indeed eligible and authorized to vote. As for the implementation, the client-side is done using JavaScript so that the client can trustlessly compute the cryptographic constructions individually, whereas the server-side is done using Node.js, but can easily be replaced by a more sophisticated and secure structure such as a permissionless blockchain platform.
Code
Repository list and official/mentioned flags are the archive's, frozen 2025-07-28. Reachability, where shown, is from one Syntology probe window (2026-09-16 to 2026-09-18); repositories not probed show nothing. GitHub stars are not tracked.
Code Syntology ran Syntology
Not run by Syntology. Nothing on this page verifies that the listed code works.
Results from the paper archive 2025-07-28
No leaderboard rows for this paper in the archive.
Report a problem or propose a change · a person checks every report against the paper or source before anything changes; decisions are listed on /corrections