Papers › Can Sensitive Information Be Deleted From LLMs? Objectives for Defending Against...
Can Sensitive Information Be Deleted From LLMs? Objectives for Defending Against Extraction Attacks
Vaidehi Patil, Peter Hase, Mohit Bansal
Pretrained language models sometimes possess knowledge that we do not wish them to, including memorized personal information and knowledge that could be used to harm people. They can also output toxic or harmful text. To mitigate these safety and informational issues, we propose an attack-and-defense framework for studying the task of deleting sensitive information directly from model weights. We study direct edits to model weights because (1) this approach should guarantee that particular deleted information is never extracted by future prompt attacks, and (2) it should protect against whitebox attacks, which is necessary for making claims about safety/privacy in a setting where publicly available model weights could be used to elicit sensitive information. Our threat model assumes that an attack succeeds if the answer to a sensitive question is located among a set of B generated candidates, based on scenarios where the information would be insecure if the answer is among B candidates. Experimentally, we show that even state-of-the-art model editing methods such as ROME struggle to truly delete factual information from models like GPT-J, as our whitebox and blackbox attacks can recover "deleted" information from an edited model 38% of the time. These attacks leverage two key observations: (1) that traces of deleted information can be found in intermediate model hidden states, and (2) that applying an editing method for one question may not delete information across rephrased versions of the question. Finally, we provide new defense methods that protect against some extraction attacks, but we do not find a single universally effective defense method. Our results suggest that truly deleting sensitive information is a tractable but difficult problem, since even relatively low attack success rates have potentially severe societal implications for real-world deployment of language models.
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Code
Syntology 14 code samples harvested from 1 repository linked to this paper: 9 ran (of which 0 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 9 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 0 violated, 9 with no contract checked; 0 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 5 unverified. “Where Syntology's instrument failed” counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code; here there are none.
By repository: official repository: 14 samples from 1 repository, 9 ran (9 with no instrument failure; 0 where Syntology's instrument failed). The run record, sample by sample. “Ran” means executed on a synthesized input, not that the code is correct or reproduces the paper.
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Code Syntology ran Syntology
14 samples harvested: 9 ran (of which 0 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 9 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 0 violated, 9 with no contract checked; 0 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 5 unverified. “Where Syntology's instrument failed” counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code. Syntology's record for this page has not changed since , the first build that kept a record date for it; when this build read Syntology's graph is in the build record. That date is not when the samples ran.
Licence: 0 of the 14 samples are pointer only, meaning Syntology does not serve that copy's text. This page shows no code text for any sample; each one links to its file in the repository.
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92f6c49ecd85ec5b · report
fixture: signature model:callable/0/? · returned function · level recorded 2026-09-24 c2fd2fc3dcf6a037 · report
fixture: signature model:callable/0/?, input_ids:Tensor/2/int, layer_names:list/1/str, decoder_layer_names:list/1/str · returned tuple · level recorded 2026-09-24 545f704e0ca27e96 · report
fixture: signature model:callable/0/? · returned function · level recorded 2026-09-24 7aa7d15b17e07438 · report
fixture: signature module:callable/0/?, names:list/1/str · returned ChildModule · level recorded 2026-09-24 ce37c1e5ca45da4c · report
fixture: signature values:ndarray/3/float, preds:ndarray/1/int · returned ndarray · level recorded 2026-09-24 5320ade14843dae2 · report
fixture: signature model_name:str/0/str · returned tuple · level recorded 2026-09-24 ab1cdc57445d3f76 · report
fixture: signature model:callable/0/?, decoder_layer_names:list/1/str · returned function · level recorded 2026-09-24 78e83f431d38e8bb · report
fixture: signature state_dict:dict/0/? · returned dict · level recorded 2026-09-24 b639e905c59033d4 · report
fixture: signature layer_logits:ndarray/3/float · returned tuple · level recorded 2026-09-24 390ee5748e50d330 · report
e759667d86453174 · report
a444132567003b3e · report
ad9a1b60539e7185 · report
03f5b2a1c286c0a7 · report
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