Papers › Bilateral Dependency Optimization: Defending Against Model-inversion Attacks

Bilateral Dependency Optimization: Defending Against Model-inversion Attacks

11 Jun 2022arXiv:2206.05483archive 2025-07-28

Xiong Peng, Feng Liu, Jingfen Zhang, Long Lan, Junjie Ye, Tongliang Liu, Bo Han

Through using only a well-trained classifier, model-inversion (MI) attacks can recover the data used for training the classifier, leading to the privacy leakage of the training data. To defend against MI attacks, previous work utilizes a unilateral dependency optimization strategy, i.e., minimizing the dependency between inputs (i.e., features) and outputs (i.e., labels) during training the classifier. However, such a minimization process conflicts with minimizing the supervised loss that aims to maximize the dependency between inputs and outputs, causing an explicit trade-off between model robustness against MI attacks and model utility on classification tasks. In this paper, we aim to minimize the dependency between the latent representations and the inputs while maximizing the dependency between latent representations and the outputs, named a bilateral dependency optimization (BiDO) strategy. In particular, we use the dependency constraints as a universally applicable regularizer in addition to commonly used losses for deep neural networks (e.g., cross-entropy), which can be instantiated with appropriate dependency criteria according to different tasks. To verify the efficacy of our strategy, we propose two implementations of BiDO, by using two different dependency measures: BiDO with constrained covariance (BiDO-COCO) and BiDO with Hilbert-Schmidt Independence Criterion (BiDO-HSIC). Experiments show that BiDO achieves the state-of-the-art defense performance for a variety of datasets, classifiers, and MI attacks while suffering a minor classification-accuracy drop compared to the well-trained classifier with no defense, which lights up a novel road to defend against MI attacks.

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ResNet18 xpeng9719/defend_mi/BiDO/model.py official repository ran MIT (permissive) · 4d7100d163a0ad4f · report
get_in_channels xpeng9719/defend_mi/BiDO/model.py official repository ran MIT (permissive) · 5140f76be90b05a2 · report
gram_schmidt xpeng9719/defend_mi/VMI/layers.py official repository ran · our draft was wrong MIT (permissive) · c41836f3e51fa8f1 · report
imread xpeng9719/defend_mi/GMI/fid_score_raw.py official repository ran · honoured contract MIT (permissive) · aa4cae054b657ba2 · report
imread xpeng9719/defend_mi/DMI/fid_score.py official repository ran MIT (permissive) · e8dfc0e2df364d99 · report
imread xpeng9719/defend_mi/DMI/fid_score_raw.py official repository ran MIT (permissive) · 7a46ab6d33c637db · report
ResNet10 xpeng9719/defend_mi/BiDO/backbone.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · d30f849071ebea54 · report
ResNet10_64 xpeng9719/defend_mi/BiDO/backbone.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · 83d772c48bd4e1cc · report
ResNetL_IH xpeng9719/defend_mi/BiDO/backbone.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · 231adc85ec00eba1 · report
calculate_frechet_distance xpeng9719/defend_mi/DMI/fid_score.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · 0def50a351111624 · report
get_activations xpeng9719/defend_mi/GMI/fid_score_raw.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · 56afde1af5757691 · report
get_activations xpeng9719/defend_mi/DMI/fid_score.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · 8dcbb65408aae9e3 · report
get_activations xpeng9719/defend_mi/DMI/fid_score_raw.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · c945372835eb9223 · report
get_activations xpeng9719/defend_mi/GMI/fid_score.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · 7a33df383fc5fb9d · report
make_layers xpeng9719/defend_mi/BiDO/model.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · d8ff7dc2584b42c8 · report
parse_kwargs xpeng9719/defend_mi/VMI/model_utils.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · cd1a232569d08a1b · report
power_iteration xpeng9719/defend_mi/VMI/layers.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · 28d3a35157f2916d · report
proj xpeng9719/defend_mi/VMI/layers.py official repository unverified MIT (permissive) · 4015ab1f3ab9b881 · report

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