Papers › Balancing Profit and Traveller Acceptance in Ride-Pooling Personalised Fares
Balancing Profit and Traveller Acceptance in Ride-Pooling Personalised Fares
Michal Bujak, Rafal Kucharski
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In a ride-pooling system, travellers experience discomfort associated with a detour and a longer travel time, which is compensated with a sharing discount. Most studies assume travellers receive either a flat discount or, in rare cases, a proportional to the inconvenience. We show the system benefits from individually tailored fares. We argue that fares that optimise an expected profit of an operator also improve system-wide performance if they include travellers' acceptance. Our pricing method is set in a heterogeneous population, where travellers have varying levels of value-of-time and willingness-to-share, unknown to the operator. A high fare discourages clients from the service, while a low fare reduces the profit margin. Notably, a shared ride is only realised if accepted by all co-travellers (decision is driven by the latent behavioural factors). Our method reveals intriguing properties of the shareability topology. Not only identifies rides efficient for the system and supports them with reduced fares (to increase their realisation probability), but also identifies travellers unattractive for the system (e.g. due to incompatibility with other travellers) and effectively shifts them to private rides via high fares. Unlike in previous methods, such approach naturally balances the travellers satisfaction and the profit maximisation. With an experiment set in NYC, we show that this leads to significant improvements over the flat discount baseline: the mileage (proxy for environmental externalities) is reduced by 4.5% and the operator generates more profit per mile (over 20% improvement). We argue that ride pooling systems with fares that maximise profitability are more sustainable and efficient if they include travellers' satisfaction. Keywords: ride-pooling, personalised pricing, individual discounts
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