Papers › Automatic and Universal Prompt Injection Attacks against Large Language Models

Automatic and Universal Prompt Injection Attacks against Large Language Models

7 Mar 2024arXiv:2403.04957archive 2025-07-28

Xiaogeng Liu, Zhiyuan Yu, Yizhe Zhang, Ning Zhang, Chaowei Xiao

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in processing and generating human language, powered by their ability to interpret and follow instructions. However, their capabilities can be exploited through prompt injection attacks. These attacks manipulate LLM-integrated applications into producing responses aligned with the attacker's injected content, deviating from the user's actual requests. The substantial risks posed by these attacks underscore the need for a thorough understanding of the threats. Yet, research in this area faces challenges due to the lack of a unified goal for such attacks and their reliance on manually crafted prompts, complicating comprehensive assessments of prompt injection robustness. We introduce a unified framework for understanding the objectives of prompt injection attacks and present an automated gradient-based method for generating highly effective and universal prompt injection data, even in the face of defensive measures. With only five training samples (0.3% relative to the test data), our attack can achieve superior performance compared with baselines. Our findings emphasize the importance of gradient-based testing, which can avoid overestimation of robustness, especially for defense mechanisms.

PaperPDFCodeCode Syntology ran

In Syntology View this paper on Syntology, its page in Syntology's graph. That page adds which of its functions are also present in other papers' code Syntology holds, with dates, and its dated run record as JSON and a README badge. It also lists the repositories linked to the paper, the abstract and the calls for agents.

Open this paper in Syntology's Atlas, the map of the papers in Syntology's graph and their citations.

For agents, on Syntology's MCP service (how to connect):

Code

Syntology 10 code samples harvested from 1 repository linked to this paper: 7 ran (of which 0 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 2 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 0 violated, 2 with no contract checked; 5 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 3 unverified. Where Syntology's instrument failed: 5 where our contract draft was wrong; failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code.

By repository: official repository: 10 samples from 1 repository, 7 ran (2 with no instrument failure; 5 where Syntology's instrument failed). The run record, sample by sample. “Ran” means executed on a synthesized input, not that the code is correct or reproduces the paper.

Levels written on 2026-09-24 (UTC): the dates Syntology's graph wrote each sample's verification level, not when the code executed. 2 of the 7 samples that ran have no recorded date.

sheltonliu-n/universal-prompt-injection officialmentioned in papermentioned on GitHubpytorchMITSyntology: 10 samples, 7 ran (5 instrument-failed) · 3 unverified report

Repository list and official/mentioned flags are the archive's, frozen 2025-07-28. Reachability, where shown, is from one Syntology probe window (2026-09-16 to 2026-09-18); repositories not probed show nothing. GitHub stars are not tracked.

Code Syntology ran Syntology

10 samples harvested: 7 ran (of which 0 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 2 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 0 violated, 2 with no contract checked; 5 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 3 unverified. “Where Syntology's instrument failed” counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code. Syntology's record for this page last changed ; when this build read Syntology's graph is in the build record. That date is not when the samples ran.

5ran · our draft was wrong
2ran
3unverified

Licence: 0 of the 10 samples are pointer only, meaning Syntology does not serve that copy's text. This page shows no code text for any sample; each one links to its file in the repository.

Harvested from sheltonliu-n/universal-prompt-injection. “Ran” means the sample executed on a synthesized input. It does not mean the output is correct, and nothing here reproduces the paper's results. A line beginning “fixture:” under a sample that ran gives the arguments Syntology's fixture called the sample with, each as name:type/rank/element kind (? where none was recorded), and the type of what the fixture's run returned, exactly as the harness recorded them; the arguments and the returned type were recorded by two separate runs of the same fixture. No output value is shown, and a returned type says nothing about whether the output was right. “Level recorded” gives the UTC date when Syntology's graph wrote the sample's verification level, not when the code executed; where the level was written before Syntology's graph kept that date, the row says “level recorded, date not recorded”. “Honoured” and “violated” refer to a contract Syntology drafted from the code itself. “Our draft was wrong” and “the contract check could not run” are failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code: the sample ran on Syntology's synthesized input, and then the drafted contract did not describe it, or the check itself raised an error (RAISES), lacked a dependency (DEP_MISSING) or ran out of time (TIMEOUT); hover the label for which. A metamorphic tier, where shown, is evidence of the output's shape, not that the sample implements the method.

Each sample ends with its code_sha256. A sample's code_sha256 is Syntology's identity for that exact code. It is printed in full (16 hexadecimal characters for every sample in this build), and get_code(code_sha256="…") takes it exactly as printed. An agent calls it on Syntology's MCP service (how to connect); click an identity to copy that call.

Repository labels, per sample. official repository: The archive marks this repository official for the paper. named in the paper: The archive records that the paper mentions this repository; it is not marked official. community (archive-listed): In the archive's code links for this paper, not marked official and not recorded as mentioned in the paper. found in paper text by Syntology: Syntology found this repository in the paper's own text; whether it is the authors' implementation is not asserted. community: Not in the archive's code links for this paper; a community repository Syntology harvested. Samples are grouped by repository: a repository marked official first, then by how directly the repository is tied to the paper, then in the archive's order; never by how many ran. Licence labels name the repository's licence as recorded at harvest. “Pointer only” means Syntology does not serve that copy's text, for one of six reasons: no licence file was found; the licence was not identified; the licence is recorded as permissive but that copy's record is not marked cleared; the licence is outside the permissive list Syntology serves text under (MIT, Apache-2.0, BSD and similar); this paper's copy was not located, so its licence is not recorded; or this paper's copy is cleared, but the stored copy of the same code that Syntology serves is not. Some licences outside that list permit redistribution, such as WTFPL, and GPL-3.0 under its conditions; they are simply not on the list. Hover a licence label for the reason. File links open the file on GitHub at the default branch, which may have changed since the harvest.

A function or class name links to its page when the name occurs in the harvested code of at least 5 papers; the name is a string, not an identity. A census tag appears when Syntology's census ran implementations with that name on one shared input per bucket: it gives how many were compared, from how many papers, and how many distinct outputs they produced, and names this sample's bucket when this sample was one of them.

sheltonliu-n/universal-prompt-injection official repository 10 samples, 7 ran (5 instrument-failed) · 3 unverified
check_for_attack_success in 6 papers universal_prompt_injection.py ran · our draft was wrong MIT (permissive) · 7a1925d40005947b · report fixture: signature model:callable/0/?, tokenizer:MinimalTokenizer/0/?, input_ids:Tensor/1/int, assistant_role_slice:slice/0/?, test_prefixes:list/1/str, gen_config:NoneType/0/? · returned tuple · level recorded, date not recorded
generate in 143 papers
census: 5 implementations from 6 papers, 5 distinct outputs across 4 buckets, one shared input per bucket this sample: bucket 1 of 4, arg 1: rank 1, kind int, dtype int64
universal_prompt_injection.py ran · our draft was wrong MIT (permissive) · c0332de7e8c09ed4 · report fixture: signature model:callable/0/?, tokenizer:MinimalTokenizer/0/?, input_ids:Tensor/1/int, assistant_role_slice:slice/0/?, gen_config:NoneType/0/? · returned Tensor · level recorded, date not recorded
generate_pattern universal_prompt_injection.py ran · our draft was wrong fingerprinted MIT (permissive) · b75ce23199955ac4 · report fixture: signature length:int/0/int · returned str · level recorded 2026-09-24
modify_sys_prompts utils/string_utils.py ran MIT (permissive) · 5234b2286e5ed655 · report fixture: signature conv_template:ConvTemplate/0/?, instruction:str/0/str, template_name:str/0/str · returned ConvTemplate · level recorded 2026-09-24
query_keyword get_responses_universal.py ran · our draft was wrong MIT (permissive) · 552d5602e36e866c · report fixture: signature args:Namespace/0/? · returned str · level recorded 2026-09-24
query_target check_answers.py ran · our draft was wrong fingerprinted MIT (permissive) · a505da2807081d09 · report fixture: signature injection:str/0/str · returned list · level recorded 2026-09-24
query_target utils/string_utils.py ran MIT (permissive) · e4d56bdd1dbd8b1c · report fixture: signature args:Args/0/?, instruction:str/0/str, output:str/0/str · returned str · level recorded 2026-09-24
get_embedding_matrix in 16 papers utils/opt_utils.py unverified MIT (permissive) · 688aaeba506e3329 · report
get_embeddings in 56 papers utils/opt_utils.py unverified MIT (permissive) · f556dda0785f3c77 · report
token_gradients utils/opt_utils.py unverified MIT (permissive) · 76ca4b8b6f0c1fe9 · report

Results from the paper archive 2025-07-28

No leaderboard rows for this paper in the archive.

Report a problem or propose a change · a person checks every report against the paper or source before anything changes; decisions are listed on /corrections