Papers › Atomic Loans: Cryptocurrency Debt Instruments
Atomic Loans: Cryptocurrency Debt Instruments
Matthew Black, TingWei Liu, Tony Cai
The archive published only this paper's code-link row. Authors, date and abstract are from arXiv's metadata (CC0), read from the Kaggle arXiv metadata snapshot of 2026-09-12 where its title matched the archive's; the title is the archive's.
Atomic swaps enable the transfer of value between the cryptocurrencies of various blockchains without the need to trust an intermediary. In this paper, we propose the concept of atomic loans, which utilize atomic swap technology to allow market participants to create overcollateralized debt instruments in a trustless and disintermediated manner. The primary use cases for atomic loans include enabling fiat/stablecoin access for cryptocurrency holders to participate within legacy systems, as well as enabling leverage for margin trading. We also introduce a bidding process for liquidating collateral in the case of default which provides the ability for a more fair distribution of collateral.
Code
Repository list and official/mentioned flags are the archive's, frozen 2025-07-28. Reachability, where shown, is from one Syntology probe window (2026-09-16 to 2026-09-18); repositories not probed show nothing. GitHub stars are not tracked.
Code Syntology ran Syntology
Not run by Syntology. Nothing on this page verifies that the listed code works.
Results from the paper archive 2025-07-28
No leaderboard rows for this paper in the archive.
Report a problem or propose a change · a person checks every report against the paper or source before anything changes; decisions are listed on /corrections