Papers › Anti-Forgery: Towards a Stealthy and Robust DeepFake Disruption Attack via Adversarial...
Anti-Forgery: Towards a Stealthy and Robust DeepFake Disruption Attack via Adversarial Perceptual-aware Perturbations
Run Wang, Ziheng Huang, Zhikai Chen, Li Liu, Jing Chen, Lina Wang
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DeepFake is becoming a real risk to society and brings potential threats to both individual privacy and political security due to the DeepFaked multimedia are realistic and convincing. However, the popular DeepFake passive detection is an ex-post forensics countermeasure and failed in blocking the disinformation spreading in advance. To address this limitation, researchers study the proactive defense techniques by adding adversarial noises into the source data to disrupt the DeepFake manipulation. However, the existing studies on proactive DeepFake defense via injecting adversarial noises are not robust, which could be easily bypassed by employing simple image reconstruction revealed in a recent study MagDR. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of the existing forgery techniques and propose a novel \emph{anti-forgery} technique that helps users protect the shared facial images from attackers who are capable of applying the popular forgery techniques. Our proposed method generates perceptual-aware perturbations in an incessant manner which is vastly different from the prior studies by adding adversarial noises that is sparse. Experimental results reveal that our perceptual-aware perturbations are robust to diverse image transformations, especially the competitive evasion technique, MagDR via image reconstruction. Our findings potentially open up a new research direction towards thorough understanding and investigation of perceptual-aware adversarial attack for protecting facial images against DeepFakes in a proactive and robust manner. We open-source our tool to foster future research. Code is available at https://github.com/AbstractTeen/AntiForgery/.
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