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Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Fault Detection and Diagnosis: A Comprehensive Benchmark on the Tennessee Eastman Process
Vitaliy Pozdnyakov, Aleksandr Kovalenko, Ilya Makarov, Mikhail Drobyshevskiy, Kirill Lukyanov
Integrating machine learning into Automated Control Systems (ACS) enhances decision-making in industrial process management. One of the limitations to the widespread adoption of these technologies in industry is the vulnerability of neural networks to adversarial attacks. This study explores the threats in deploying deep learning models for fault diagnosis in ACS using the Tennessee Eastman Process dataset. By evaluating three neural networks with different architectures, we subject them to six types of adversarial attacks and explore five different defense methods. Our results highlight the strong vulnerability of models to adversarial samples and the varying effectiveness of defense strategies. We also propose a novel protection approach by combining multiple defense methods and demonstrate it's efficacy. This research contributes several insights into securing machine learning within ACS, ensuring robust fault diagnosis in industrial processes.
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