Papers › 3:1 Nesting Rules in Redistricting

3:1 Nesting Rules in Redistricting

26 Jul 2023arXiv:2308.00605links table onlyarchive 2025-07-28

Christopher Donnay

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In legislative redistricting, most states draw their House and Senate maps separately. Ohio and Wisconsin require that their Senate districts be made with a 3:1 nesting rule, i.e., out of triplets of adjacent House districts. We seek to study the impact of this requirement on redistricting, specifically on the number of seats won by a particular political party. We compare two ensembles generated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods; one which uses the ReCom chain to generate Senate maps without a nesting requirement, and the other which uses a chain that generates Senate maps with a 3:1 nesting requirement. We find that requiring a 3:1 nesting rule has minimal impact on the distribution of seats won. Moreover, we study the impact the chosen House map has on the distribution of nested Senate maps, and find that an extreme seat bias at the House level does not significantly impact the distribution of seats won at the Senate level.

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