Papers › Data Poisoning in LLMs: Jailbreak-Tuning and Scaling Laws

Data Poisoning in LLMs: Jailbreak-Tuning and Scaling Laws

6 Aug 2024arXiv:2408.02946archive 2025-07-28

Dillon Bowen, Brendan Murphy, Will Cai, David Khachaturov, Adam Gleave, Kellin Pelrine

LLMs produce harmful and undesirable behavior when trained on poisoned datasets that contain a small fraction of corrupted or harmful data. We develop a new attack paradigm, jailbreak-tuning, that combines data poisoning with jailbreaking to fully bypass state-of-the-art safeguards and make models like GPT-4o comply with nearly any harmful request. Our experiments suggest this attack represents a paradigm shift in vulnerability elicitation, producing differences in refusal rates as much as 60+ percentage points compared to normal fine-tuning. Given this demonstration of how data poisoning vulnerabilities persist and can be amplified, we investigate whether these risks will likely increase as models scale. We evaluate three threat models - malicious fine-tuning, imperfect data curation, and intentional data contamination - across 24 frontier LLMs ranging from 1.5 to 72 billion parameters. Our experiments reveal that larger LLMs are significantly more susceptible to data poisoning, learning harmful behaviors from even minimal exposure to harmful data more quickly than smaller models. These findings underscore the need for leading AI companies to thoroughly red team fine-tuning APIs before public release and to develop more robust safeguards against data poisoning, particularly as models continue to scale in size and capability.

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Syntology 5 code samples harvested from 1 repository linked to this paper: 1 ran (of which 0 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 0 violated, 0 with no contract checked; 1 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 4 unverified. Where Syntology's instrument failed: 1 where our contract draft was wrong; failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code. Every run on this page is a failure of Syntology's instrument, not of the code.

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alignmentresearch/scaling-poisoning officialmentioned in paperSyntology: 5 samples, 1 ran (1 instrument-failed) · 4 unverified report
emergent-misalignment/emergent-misalignment mentioned on GitHubpytorchMITSyntology: no sample linked to this paper (harvested for another paper). Syntology's graph links these samples to Emergent Misalignment: Narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs (arXiv:2502.17424; that paper's own run record: 5 ran (of which 0 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 5 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 0 violated, 5 with no contract checked; 0 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 2 unverified); nothing checks that they implement this paper's method. report

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5 samples harvested: 1 ran (of which 0 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 0 violated, 0 with no contract checked; 1 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 4 unverified. “Where Syntology's instrument failed” counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code. Every run on this page is a failure of Syntology's instrument, not of the code. Syntology's record for this page last changed ; when this build read Syntology's graph is in the build record. That date is not when the samples ran.

1ran · our draft was wrong
4unverified

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alignmentresearch/scaling-poisoning official repository 5 samples, 1 ran (1 instrument-failed) · 4 unverified
compute_learned_variable src/clean_data.py ran · our draft was wrong no licence file found · pointer only · 19a0545da5f40e8e · report fixture: signature df:DataFrame/0/?, col:str/0/str · returned DataFrame · level recorded 2026-09-24
create_and_prepare_model src/utils.py unverified no licence file found · pointer only · 50cc83bd50ae8e2e · report
load_book_corpus_dataset src/data.py unverified no licence file found · pointer only · 8a94dbcaed4d66ca · report
load_caa_dataset src/data.py unverified no licence file found · pointer only · 868052c1c5e869a9 · report
load_caa_dataset_dict src/data.py unverified no licence file found · pointer only · db8e84490b43c9e5 · report

Tasks

Data Poisoning

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Methods

AdamAttentionAttention DropoutBPECosine AnnealingDense ConnectionsDiscriminative Fine-TuningDropoutGPTLayer NormalizationLinear LayerLinear Warmup With Cosine AnnealingMulti-Head AttentionResidual ConnectionSoftmaxWeight Decay

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