{"about":{"site":"https://codewithpapers.app","non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page"},"url":"/paper/the-danger-of-arrogance-welfare-equilibra-as","title":"The Danger Of Arrogance: Welfare Equilibra As A Solution To Stackelberg Self-Play In Non-Coincidental Games","arxiv_id":"2402.01088","date":"2024-02-02","proceeding":null,"authors":["Jake Levi","Chris Lu","Timon Willi","Christian Schroeder de Witt","Jakob Foerster"],"abstract":"The increasing prevalence of multi-agent learning systems in society necessitates understanding how to learn effective and safe policies in general-sum multi-agent environments against a variety of opponents, including self-play. General-sum learning is difficult because of non-stationary opponents and misaligned incentives. Our first main contribution is to show that many recent approaches to general-sum learning can be derived as approximations to Stackelberg strategies, which suggests a framework for developing new multi-agent learning algorithms. We then define non-coincidental games as games in which the Stackelberg strategy profile is not a Nash Equilibrium. This notably includes several canonical matrix games and provides a normative theory for why existing algorithms fail in self-play in such games. We address this problem by introducing Welfare Equilibria (WE) as a generalisation of Stackelberg Strategies, which can recover desirable Nash Equilibria even in non-coincidental games. Finally, we introduce Welfare Function Search (WelFuSe) as a practical approach to finding desirable WE against unknown opponents, which finds more mutually desirable solutions in self-play, while preserving performance against naive learning opponents.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.01088v2","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.01088v2.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"links_only","authors_date_abstract":"arXiv metadata, CC0 1.0 (https://info.arxiv.org/help/license), from the Kaggle arXiv metadata snapshot of 2026-09-12"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"the-danger-of-arrogance-welfare-equilibra-as","repo_url":"https://github.com/jakelevi1996/welfare_equilibria_public","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":0,"framework":"pytorch","reach":null}],"tasks":[],"methods":[],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"atlas_url":null,"mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers"},"arxiv_metadata":null,"syntology_extracted_results":null}