{"about":{"site":"https://codewithpapers.app","non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page"},"url":"/paper/optimal-incentives-to-mitigate-epidemics-a","title":"Optimal incentives to mitigate epidemics: a Stackelberg mean field game approach","arxiv_id":"2011.03105","date":"2020-11-05","proceeding":null,"authors":["Alexander Aurell","Rene Carmona","Gokce Dayanikli","Mathieu Lauriere"],"abstract":"Motivated by models of epidemic control in large populations, we consider a Stackelberg mean field game model between a principal and a mean field of agents evolving on a finite state space. The agents play a non-cooperative game in which they can control their transition rates between states to minimize an individual cost. The principal can influence the resulting Nash equilibrium through incentives so as to optimize its own objective. We analyze this game using a probabilistic approach. We then propose an application to an epidemic model of SIR type in which the agents control their interaction rate and the principal is a regulator acting with non pharmaceutical interventions. To compute the solutions, we propose an innovative numerical approach based on Monte Carlo simulations and machine learning tools for stochastic optimization. We conclude with numerical experiments by illustrating the impact of the agents' and the regulator's optimal decisions in two models: a basic SIR model with semi-explicit solutions and a more complex model with a larger state space.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.03105v2","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2011.03105v2.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"links_only","authors_date_abstract":"arXiv metadata, CC0 1.0 (https://info.arxiv.org/help/license), from the Kaggle arXiv metadata snapshot of 2026-09-12"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"optimal-incentives-to-mitigate-epidemics-a","repo_url":"https://github.com/gokce-d/StackelbergMFG","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":0,"mentioned_in_github":0,"framework":"tf","reach":{"status":"unanswered"}}],"tasks":[],"methods":[],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"atlas_url":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus=2011.03105","mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers"},"arxiv_metadata":null,"syntology_extracted_results":null}