{"about":{"site":"https://codewithpapers.app","non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page"},"url":"/paper/membership-inference-attack-using-self","title":"Membership Inference Attack Using Self Influence Functions","arxiv_id":"2205.13680","date":"2022-05-26","proceeding":null,"authors":["Gilad Cohen","Raja Giryes"],"abstract":"Member inference (MI) attacks aim to determine if a specific data sample was used to train a machine learning model. Thus, MI is a major privacy threat to models trained on private sensitive data, such as medical records. In MI attacks one may consider the black-box settings, where the model's parameters and activations are hidden from the adversary, or the white-box case where they are available to the attacker. In this work, we focus on the latter and present a novel MI attack for it that employs influence functions, or more specifically the samples' self-influence scores, to perform the MI prediction. We evaluate our attack on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny ImageNet datasets, using versatile architectures such as AlexNet, ResNet, and DenseNet. Our attack method achieves new state-of-the-art results for both training with and without data augmentations. Code is available at https://github.com/giladcohen/sif_mi_attack.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.13680v1","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.13680v1.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"abstracts"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"membership-inference-attack-using-self","repo_url":"https://github.com/giladcohen/sif_mi_attack","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":1,"framework":"pytorch","reach":null}],"tasks":[{"task_slug":"inference-attack","task_name":"Inference Attack"},{"task_slug":"membership-inference-attack","task_name":"Membership Inference Attack"}],"methods":[{"method_slug":"1x1-convolution","method_name":"1x1 Convolution"},{"method_slug":"average-pooling","method_name":"Average Pooling"},{"method_slug":"batch-normalization","method_name":"Batch Normalization"},{"method_slug":"bottleneck-residual-block","method_name":"Bottleneck Residual Block"},{"method_slug":"concatenated-skip-connection","method_name":"Concatenated Skip Connection"},{"method_slug":"convolution","method_name":"Convolution"},{"method_slug":"dense-block","method_name":"Dense Block"},{"method_slug":"dense-connections","method_name":"Dense Connections"},{"method_slug":"dropout","method_name":"Dropout"},{"method_slug":"global-average-pooling","method_name":"Global Average Pooling"},{"method_slug":"kaiming-initialization","method_name":"Kaiming Initialization"},{"method_slug":"max-pooling","method_name":"Max Pooling"},{"method_slug":"relu","method_name":"ReLU"},{"method_slug":"residual-block","method_name":"Residual Block"},{"method_slug":"residual-connection","method_name":"Residual Connection"},{"method_slug":"softmax","method_name":"Softmax"}],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"atlas_url":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus=2205.13680","mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers"},"arxiv_metadata":null,"syntology_extracted_results":null}