{"about":{"site":"https://codewithpapers.app","non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page"},"url":"/paper/empirical-analysis-of-eip-1559-transaction","title":"Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security","arxiv_id":"2201.05574","date":"2022-01-14","proceeding":null,"authors":["Yulin Liu","Yuxuan Lu","Kartik Nayak","Fan Zhang","Luyao Zhang","Yinhong Zhao"],"abstract":"A transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is an essential component of a blockchain protocol. However, a systematic evaluation of the real-world impact of TFMs is still absent. Using rich data from the Ethereum blockchain, the mempool, and exchanges, we study the effect of EIP-1559, one of the earliest-deployed TFMs that depart from the traditional first-price auction paradigm. We conduct a rigorous and comprehensive empirical study to examine its causal effect on blockchain transaction fee dynamics, transaction waiting times, and consensus security. Our results show that EIP-1559 improves the user experience by mitigating intrablock differences in the gas price paid and reducing users' waiting times. However, EIP-1559 has only a small effect on gas fee levels and consensus security. In addition, we find that when Ether's price is more volatile, the waiting time is significantly higher. We also verify that a larger block size increases the presence of siblings. These findings suggest new directions for improving TFMs.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.05574v4","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2201.05574v4.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"abstracts"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"empirical-analysis-of-eip-1559-transaction","repo_url":"https://github.com/SciEcon/EIP1559","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":1,"framework":"none","reach":null},{"paper_slug":"empirical-analysis-of-eip-1559-transaction","repo_url":"https://github.com/decensyslab/eip-1559-empirical-study","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":1,"framework":"none","reach":null}],"tasks":[],"methods":[],"datasets_introduced":[{"slug":"replication-data-for-empirical-analysis-of","name":"Replication Data for: \"Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security\"","full_name":"Replication Data for: \"Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security\""}],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"atlas_url":null,"mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers"},"arxiv_metadata":null,"syntology_extracted_results":null}