{"about":{"site":"https://codewithpapers.app","non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page"},"url":"/paper/a-game-of-competition-for-risk","title":"A Game of Competition for Risk","arxiv_id":"2305.18941","date":"2023-05-30","proceeding":null,"authors":["Louis Abraham"],"abstract":"In this study, we present models where participants strategically select their risk levels and earn corresponding rewards, mirroring real-world competition across various sectors. Our analysis starts with a normal form game involving two players in a continuous action space, confirming the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium and providing an analytical solution. We then extend this analysis to multi-player scenarios, introducing a new numerical algorithm for its calculation. A key novelty of our work lies in using regret minimization algorithms to solve continuous games through discretization. This groundbreaking approach enables us to incorporate additional real-world factors like market frictions and risk correlations among firms. We also experimentally validate that the Nash equilibrium in our model also serves as a correlated equilibrium. Our findings illuminate how market frictions and risk correlations affect strategic risk-taking. We also explore how policy measures can impact risk-taking and its associated rewards, with our model providing broader applicability than the Diamond-Dybvig framework. We make our methodology and open-source code available at https://github.com/louisabraham/cfrgame Finally, we contribute methodologically by advocating the use of algorithms in economics, shifting focus from finite games to games with continuous action sets. Our study provides a solid framework for analyzing strategic interactions in continuous action games, emphasizing the importance of market frictions, risk correlations, and policy measures in strategic risk-taking dynamics.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.18941v1","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.18941v1.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"abstracts"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"a-game-of-competition-for-risk","repo_url":"https://github.com/louisabraham/cfrgame","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":0,"framework":"none","reach":null}],"tasks":[],"methods":[{"method_slug":"focus","method_name":"Focus"}],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"syntology_url":null,"atlas_url":null,"mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers"},"arxiv_metadata":null,"syntology_extracted_results":null}